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       What is the first thing one thinks when the philosopher "Descartes" is mentioned? 
Too often the reply is "dualism". Descartes is universally recognized as that philosopher 
who radically distinguished mind from body, mind understood as 'thinking substance', 
body as 'extended substance'; he is understood to have maintained that thought pertains to 
his very nature, and cannot be separated from that nature. This is true of Descartes, even 
though it is not true to conclude that he held that he was a thinking thing and only a 
thinking thing.1 But we tend to think of Descartes as regarding himself as bodiless, or at 
best as having some remote relation to his body. Insofar as this is the understanding we 
have of him, we dismiss his philosophy as obviously abstract and fantastic. However 
compelling intellectually its first indubitable proposition, "I think, therefore I am", its 
irrelevance to our own concerns is the chief impediment to taking Descartes seriously.  
       Descartes is a very rigorous philosopher who insists that what comes first is what 
must be known before something else can be known. It was his genius to recognize that 
thought precedes what is the object of thought, and thus that mind must be known before 
body can be known. He established this with such authority that the whole seventeenth 
century revolution is science was founded upon it. This persists in our own time, in the 
science now of the twenty-first century, even though we have become terribly confused 
about these matters and this order of priority of thinking over all else. If ever we needed 
the antidote of Cartesian reason, it is today when we wonder if the computers we create 
are really the paradigm of our thinking, or when we speculate that the mapping of the 
human genome might finally reveal who we really are. But to make Descartes relevant to 
such discussions, we must be convinced that his philosophy does have something to say 
not only about mind, not only about body (which is the object of natural science), but 
about our embodied selves. This paper addresses these matters as Descartes himself 
addressed them in the last few years of his life. It shows Descartes intimately engaged in 
his times, in life and friendship, and always in lively thought.  
       Its subject is amour as it appears in Descartes' thought, and also as it is exhibited in 
his relation to Princess Elizabeth of the Palatinate. As we shall see, these two  love, as 
one of the passions which he writes about, and love as he experiences it and shares it with 
                                                
1 He says this in Meditation II: "I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, 
or intelligence, or intellect, or reason  words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now." But this is 
preceded by the important statement: "At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily 
true." AT vii, 27. 
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Princess Elizabeth, are intertwined in an intriguing, compelling way. Descartes reveals 
himself tender, compassionate, gentle and loving to this very intelligent, passionate 
young woman. Descartes met her in 1643 -- she was 24, he was 47 -- at The Hague where 
with her mother and siblings she lived under the protection of the Dutch government, the 
family having been exiled from the Palatinate since the beginning of the Thirty Years 
War [1618-1648].2 It is to answer her questions about her duty to her family, especially as 
this impedes her pursuit of a philosophical life, that he writes The Passions of the Soul, 
his final work.  
       To her earlier he had dedicated the Principles of Philosophy. His words on that 
occasion are not flattery -- he has learned how she abhors the compliments of courtiers3  
but the honest esteem of one who sees in her his true intellectual companion and 
soulmate:  
I have even greater evidence of your powers  and this is special to myself  
in the fact that you are the only person I have so far found who has 
completely understood all my previously published works. Many other 
people, even those of the utmost acumen and learning, find them very 
obscure; and it generally happens with almost everyone else that if they 
are accomplished in Metaphysics they hate Geometry, while if they have 
mastered Geometry they do not grasp what I have written on First 
Philosophy. Your intellect is, to my knowledge, unique in finding 
everything equally clear; and this is why my use of the term 
`incomparable' is quite deserved.4  
       The correspondence between Descartes and Elizabeth began in May, 1643, and 
continued until shortly before his death.5 While she resided at The Hague he visited her 
occasionally from his country house in the village of Egmond, but not as frequently as 
she would have liked. After her disagreeable mother could take her no longer, Elizabeth 
removed to Berlin in the autumn of 1646, to the home of her childhood friend and cousin, 
Frederick William, the elector of Brandenburg, to live again with her Aunt Charlotte, the 
dowager electress. Descartes and Elizabeth never saw each other again, although it was 
Descartes' plan three years later that he would, on his return from Stockholm in the 
summer of 1650, visit her, perhaps even to join her scholarly enterprises at Heidelberg, 
the long war having finally been concluded with the Treaty of Westphalia, 24 October 
                                                
2 The actions of her father Frederick, the Elector of the Palatinate, in accepting the throne of Bohemia from 
Protestant rebels precipitated that war. He was routed from his kingship in less than a year, stripped of his 
electorship in the Holy Roman Empire and all his territories, and fled to Holland under the protection of his 
uncle, the Prince of Orange. 
3 The opening paragraph of his first letter to her is effusive to an extreme, clearly the efforts of one 
untrained in the ways of the courtier. She writes back noting that false praise has an opposite effect on her 
from what is intended: "...my upbringing, in a place where the ordinary fashion of conversing has 
accustomed me to listen to people incapable of telling the truth, has made me always sure of the contrary of 
their discourses.." AT, iii, 683. 
4 Principles of Philosophy, Dedicatory Letter to Elizabeth, AT viiia, 1-4. 
5 His last letter to her is from Stockholm, 9 October 1649, and hers to him on 4 December 1649. He died of 
pneumonia in Stockholm on 11 February 1650. 
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1648. Elizabeth too had plans. Her brother, Charles-Louis, had returned to Heidelberg, 
the capital of his ruined kingdom, and immediately set to work to rebuild, re-establish, re-
invent the Palatinate. He consulted Elizabeth concerning the re-opening of the University. 
She drew up a list of scholars to be invited to teach at Heidelberg, and Descartes was of 
course on her list, as was Spinoza.6 Heidelberg succeeded, the University was restored, 
but her plans for Descartes and Spinoza did not materialize.  
       The correspondence was initiated by Elizabeth, following a visit to The Hague by 
Descartes expressly to see her. She was indisposed at the time, and wrote immediately to 
express her disappointment at missing his visit, especially in view of a question about his 
metaphysics which she with some urgency wanted to raise with him. Her question, as 
Descartes observes, is the one which most properly can be put, in view of his published 
work: how can the soul, being only a thinking substance, move the body by voluntary 
action? He begins, "There are two things about the human soul on which the entire 
knowledge of its nature depends. The first is that it thinks, the second that, being united 
to the body, it can act and be acted upon with it."7 He grants that he has said almost 
nothing about the second, because his metaphysics rests on the first, and the distinction 
between soul and body. To discuss their union at the same time would have been a 
possible hindrance. But on the union depends all ethics and it is an essential part of his 
project to address that issue. The crucial matter is not to attempt to conceive the action of 
soul on the body after the manner of one body moving another body. It is in her reply that 
she gently rebukes him for his excessive compliments, which he never attempts again, 
and then makes her question more personal and of practical significance.  
...the life I am constrained to lead does not leave me the disposition of 
enough time to acquire a habit of meditation according to your rules. So 
many interests of my house that I must not neglect, so many conversations 
and civilities that I cannot avoid, batter my feeble spirit with such bad 
feelings and boredom that it rendered it for a long time afterward useless 
for anything else.8  
Her life at court, full of tedium and treachery, hypocrisy, the irritability and scorn of her 
mother who neglected the upbringing and discipline of her many unruly children9, was a 
source of great tribulation for Elizabeth, yet her sense of duty would not allow her to 
escape from responsibility for her family and kingdom. Her questions about the 
interaction of soul and body are not the abstract questions of an academic but the 
                                                
6 Andrea Nye, The Princess and the Philosopher, Lanham, Maryland, 1999, 159. 
7 AT iii, 664;CSMK 217-8. 
8 AT iii, 684. 
9 Her mother, Elizabeth Stuart, daughter of James I, had squandered what was left of the family money, her 
eldest brother had died in a boating accident, her father helplessly looking on [he himself died of fever in 
1632 on the battlefield], somewhat later her brother Edward will prove traitor to the Protestant cause by 
converting to the Roman Church to marry a Polish princess, her flirtatious sister Louise will bring down the 
wrath of her brother Philip on the head of her boastful lover (Monsieur Espinay boasted he had "succeeded" 
with both Louise and the Queen herself), murdering him on the street. The princes were frequently in 
brawls and other sorts of rowdiness, and her mother left all responsibility for the behaviour of her siblings 
with Elizabeth, blaming her for their failings. See Nye, 3, 5-7, and passim. 
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questions of a real woman immersed in affairs of family and state who is all the same 
scholarly and greatly attracted to the Cartesian philosophy.  
       In an effort to do better, although he can only do what a philosopher can do, 
Descartes replied more amply: there are three kinds of primitive ideas, "each of which is 
known in its own proper manner and not by comparison with any of the others": the soul 
conceived only by the pure intellect; body likewise known by the intellect alone, but 
much better by the intellect aided by imagination; and the union of soul and body, known 
only obscurely by intellect or even the intellect aided by the imagination, but very clearly 
by the senses. "It is the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from 
meditation and from the study of things which exercise the imagination, that teaches us 
how to conceive the union of the soul and the body." Then he exhorts the Princess to 
follow his own example: "I can say with truth that the chief rule I have always observed 
in my studies, which I think has been the most useful to me in acquiring what knowledge 
I have, has been never to spend more than a few hours a day in the thoughts which 
occupy the imagination and a few hours a year on those which occupy the intellect alone. 
I have given all the rest of my time to the relaxation of the senses and the repose of the 
mind."10 Although he admires her ability to devote time to the meditations needed to 
know the distinction of mind and body, that is the source of her present difficulties: "I 
think it was those meditations rather than thought requiring less attention that have made 
Your Highness find obscurity in the notion we have of the union of the mind and the 
body."11 He continues:  
I believe that it is very necessary to have properly understood, once in a 
lifetime, the principles of metaphysics, since they are what gives us the 
knowledge of God and of our soul. But I think also that it would be very 
harmful to occupy one's intellect frequently in meditating upon them, 
since this would impede it from devoting itself to the functions of the 
imagination and the senses. I think the best thing is to content oneself with 
keeping in one's memory and one's belief the conclusions which one has 
once drawn from them, and then employ the rest of one's study time to 
thoughts in which the intellect co-operates with the imagination and the 
senses.12  
       Her response is frank and inquisitive still: "I see that the senses show me that the soul 
moves the body, but they do not teach me really (any more than the Understanding or the 
Imagination) the way in which it does this." Moreover, without such an explanation it 
still seems possible to her that there might be properties of the soul, unknown to us, 
perhaps even extension. "Although extension is not necessary to thought, not being 
repugnant to it either, it could suit some other function of the soul not less essential to it." 
                                                
10 To Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT iii, 692; CSMK 226-7. 
11 Ibid., 693; CSMK 227. 
12 Ibid., 695; CSMK 228. 
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She adds, "I despair of finding certainty in any thing of the world, if you don't give it to 
me, which is all that keeps me from the skepticism to which my first reasoning led."13  
       There is a break in the correspondence, and during that time Descartes did visit 
Elizabeth at The Hague. We do not know his answer to her suggestion, although it is 
clear enough what he should have answered, that `mind' is precisely what `body' is not, 
`body' precisely what `mind' is not, both opposed yet related to each other most 
remarkably  `body' as the wholly appropriate object for `mind', possessing characteristics 
of no interest except in relation to a `thinking thing', 'mind' with faculties wholly 
appropriate not to itself but to an `extended thing'. He will be moved through the course 
of their correspondence to make explicit a stronger union of soul and body.  
 
A. Descartes As Physician And Psychotherapist 
       When the correspondence resumed in July, 1644, it is clear that there was a growing 
warmth between them. Descartes writes from France, where he has been on family 
affairs. He begins:"My journey could not be accompanied by any misfortune, since I have 
been so happy during it to have been in Your Highness's mind." He is aware that she has 
been ill, which he attributes more to her soul than to her body. No doubt, he observes, the 
soul has great power over the body, but not directly through its own volition. Rather only 
by willing or thinking something else. And the best thing to think about is the power of 
nature to heal itself, or keep itself from falling ill. He hopes, he says, she is no longer ill. 
"At the same time, the desire to be certain makes me want very much to return to 
Holland...As soon as I have put my affairs in order [he was about to visit Poitou on 
family business] I shall be very anxious to return to the region where I have been so 
happy as to have the honour of speaking from time to time with your Highness. Although 
there are many people here whom I honour and esteem, I have not yet seen anything to 
keep me here." He closes with these words, "And I am, already beyond all that I can say, 
etc.14  
       With the appearance of the Principles of Philosophy and its public testimony to 
Princess Elizabeth, Descartes declared to her and to the world her great worth in his eyes. 
"It would ill become me to use flattery or to put forward any assertion which has not been 
thoroughly scrutinized, especially in a work in which I shall be trying to lay down the 
foundations of the truth. And I know that your generous and modest nature will welcome 
the simple and unadorned judgement of a philosopher more than the polished 
compliments of those with smoother tongues. I shall therefore write only what I know to 
be true either from reason or by experience, and in this introduction I propose to 
philosophize just as I do throughout the rest of the book." The Dedication is in praise of 
her virtues and, as already noted, a candid admission that no one understood his work 
better than she.  
                                                
13 To Descartes, 1 July 1643, AT iv, 1-3. 
14 To Elizabeth, 8 July 1644, AT v, 64-66; CSMK 237-8. 
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       His admiration is sincere  he had nothing to gain from Princess Elizabeth or her ill-
fated House except her scholarly appraisal of his work, her intellectual collaboration in 
prompting its extension to matters pertinent to the union of soul and body, and the 
warmth of her friendship. His concerns about her health touch her, and there will be 
letters back and forth about her various illnesses. In May, 1645, he heard that she was ill 
again, this time gravely. For several weeks she had been having a low-grade fever. 
Descartes' assessment is again that the condition is psychosomatic. He writes: "The 
ordinary cause of a slow fever is tristesse [sadness, depression]." He attributes her 
depression to the continuing persecution of her House and the persons she cares about, 
and would find its cure in this: "...by the power of your virtue, you would make your soul 
content in spite of the disgraces of Fortune." Vulgar souls who give themselves up to 
their passions are only happy or sad insofar as the things that happen to them are 
agreeable or disagreeable; noble souls have arguments that are so strong and powerful 
that their reason, in spite of sufferings, remains the master.  
For on the one side considering themselves immortal and capable of 
receiving very great contentments, and on the other side considering that 
they are joined to a mortal and fragile body, subject to many infirmities 
which cannot but perish in a few years, they do everything in their power 
to render Fortune favourable in this life, but nonetheless they esteem it so 
little, in regard to Eternity, that they almost think of events as we know 
them in the Comedies. And just as the sad and lamentable Histories which 
we see represented in a theatre, give us as much entertainment as the 
happy ones, even as they bring tears to our eyes, so those noble souls of 
which I speak have satisfaction in themselves from all things which 
happen to them, even the most vexing and insupportable.15  
       But Elizabeth takes his exhortations as male abstractions. She writes back: "Know 
then that I have a body imbued with a great part of the weaknesses of my sex, that it 
registers afflictions of the soul very easily, and does not have the strength to dismiss 
them." Then she adds,  
I would confess to you that although I do not place my happiness only on 
things which depend on fortune or the will of men, or think myself 
absolutely unhappy when I see that my house will never be restored or my 
dear ones far from misery, I cannot consider the harmful accidents that 
befall them as other than evil, nor the efforts which I take for their service 
useless without much inquietude, which as soon as it is calmed by reason 
is aroused by yet another disaster.16  
To his urging, she gives only more evidence of her suffering He replies acknowledging 
her great trials, but still he knows only one remedy: "so far as possible to distract our 
imagination and senses from them, and when obliged by prudence to consider them, to do 
                                                
15 To Elizabeth, 18 May 1645, AT iv, 200. 
16 To Descartes, 24 May 1645, AT iv, 207. 
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so with our intellect alone." She should free her mind from all sad thoughts, she should 
be "like people who convince themselves they are thinking of nothing because they are 
observing the greenness of a wood, the colours of a flower, the flight of a bird." He 
admits that all this is well known to the princess, and that it is not the theory but the 
practice which is difficult. Then he adds a very personal example: "I take the liberty of 
adding that I found by experience in my own case that the remedy I have just suggested 
cured an illness almost exactly similar...I was born of a mother who died, a few days after 
my birth, from a disease of the lungs, caused by some distress [déplaisirs]" From her he 
inherited a dry cough and a pale complexion, and the doctors thought he would come to 
an early death. But the condition was cured by his optimism originating in the habit of 
making his principal happiness to depend solely on himself. 17 
       There is something perhaps a little neurotic in Elizabeth's reply as she adds a new 
dimension to the argument. "If I could follow your last advice, I do not doubt that I would 
promptly cure myself of the maladies of my body and the weakness of my spirit. But I 
confess that I have trouble separating sense and imagination from things which are 
continually represented in discussion and letter, because I do not know how to do it 
without sinning against my duty." His therapy of separating mind and body is for 
Elizabeth a sin against her obligations. She must live in this world, must confront it and 
deal with it. She cannot absent herself to his little cottage, walk in his garden and observe 
with him the "green of a wood, the colours of a flower, the flight of a bird". "This is when 
I feel the inconvenience of being a little rational. For if I were not at all so, I could find 
common pleasures with those with whom I must live ... And if I were as rational as you 
are, I would cure myself as you have done."18  
       Still he persists, and she resists.19 With great patience and tenderness, he tries another 
tack. In his letter of 21 July 1645, noting that most letters Elizabeth receives likely arouse 
unpleasant emotion, declares that his will be different: "...if they do not give you any 
cause for joy, at least they will not make you sad... To entertain you, therefore, I shall 
simply write about the means which philosophy provides for acquiring that supreme 
felicity which common souls vainly expect from fortune, but which can be acquired only 
from ourselves." He proposes to read with her Seneca's De Vita Beata, "examine what the 
ancients have written on this question, and try to advance beyond them by adding 
something to their precepts."20 Andrea Nye says aptly, "...a philosophical troubadour 
amusing his lady".21  
 
                                                
17 To Elizabeth, May or June 1645, AT iv, 218; CSMK 249-50. 
18 To Descartes, 22 June 1645, AT iv, 233. 
19 In his to her, June 1645, AT iv, 236, where he does not buy the argument that it is her duty to be sad. 
Then he visits her some four or five days later. 
20 AT iv, 251;CSMK 256. 
21 Nye, 49. 
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B. From Psychotherapy To Philosophy 
       He does not wait for her to reply to his letter, since his intention is simply to bring to 
her some relief and happiness. He sends his assessment of Seneca on 4 August 1645. He 
has not found Seneca's work sufficiently rigorous. "I will try to explain how I think it 
should have been treated by such a philosopher, unenlightened by faith, with only natural 
reason to guide him." Seneca has said well that `all men want to live happily', and 
Descartes interprets this to be a perfect contentment of mind and inner satisfaction not 
dependent on fortune, indeed commonly not possessed by those favoured by fortune. 
What things give supreme contentment? "It seems to me that each person can make 
himself content by himself without any external assistance, provided he respects three 
conditions, which are related to the three rules of morality of the Discourse:  
1. Always apply his mind as well as he can to discover what he should or 
should not do in all circumstances of life;  
2. Have a firm and constant resolution to carry out whatever reason 
recommends without being diverted or appetites. "Virtue, I believe, 
consists precisely in sticking firmly to this resolution..."  
3. Bear in mind that while he guides himself as far as he can by reason, all 
good things which he doesn't possess are entirely outside his power. Thus 
he will become accustomed not to desire them. [Nothing can impede our 
contentment except desire and regret or repentance. When something is 
clearly outside our power, to be taller or handsomer for example, it is 
relatively easy to rid ourselves of the desire for such.]  
Virtue is sufficient to make us content in this life. But virtue unenlightened by reason 
may be false. The right use of reason, giving us true knowledge of the good, prevents 
virtue from being false. Thus the greatest felicity of man depends on the right use of 
reason. This is what Seneca should have taught.  
       Elizabeth does not fully agree: "I do not know how to rid myself of the doubt that 
one could arrive at the happiness of which you speak without the assistance of what does 
not depend entirely on one's own will." What about those whose illness prevents them 
from reasoning at all, or others which diminish the power of reason? Her examples seem 
in some way to be describing herself. She has recovered but now she is nursing sick 
Philip, her headstrong brother who will not take his medicine without her. She ends with 
"I wish to assure you that I will be, all my life, your very affectionate friend at your 
service."22 These difficulties which she brings to him might be simply her inadequacies 
and neuroses disguised as somehow universal human problems. But then, they might be 
more than that  revealing inadequacies and lacunae in Descartes' thought. We shall see.  
                                                
22 16 August 1645, AT iv, 269-70. 
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       Before her letter arrives another is on the way to her. He does not know whether his 
last letter reached her. "All the same I shall continue our correspondence in the belief that 
you will not find my letters any more tiresome than the books in your library." They 
contain no news, nothing urgent, so they can be read at her leisure. He turns now to what 
Seneca actually wrote, criticizing it chapter by chapter, giving as appropriate his own 
views. Seneca didn't distinguish carefully, but Descartes does, these three: happiness, the 
highest good, the final end at which our actions should aim. Happiness is not the highest 
good but presupposes it, for it is the contentment of the mind that comes from possessing 
it. The final end is both the highest good and its possession, therefore both happiness and 
the highest good. The ancients had three main views about the supreme good and the end 
of our actions: Epicurus, who said it was pleasure; Zeno, who insisted it was virtue; 
Aristotle who made it consist of all the perfections. Aristotle is thinking of human nature 
in general, the good which may be possessed by the most accomplished of men; Zeno is 
thinking of the supreme good which each person can possess, and he is right to say it is 
virtue, since that alone depends entirely on our free will; Epicurus, who considered 
happiness to be contentment of mind. And he is correct, but in order to achieve a 
contentment which is solid, we need to pursue virtue, that is to say, to maintain a firm and 
constant will to bring about what we judge to be the best, and to use all the powers of the 
mind to judge well. Thus Descartes draws together his three rules from the Discourse and 
the ancients.  
       Elizabeth's next to him, August 1646, assures him that she has received both his 
letters; and indicates here that she has understood Descartes' views as comprehending and 
reconciling the views of the ancients in a higher consideration. But in her letter of 13 Sept 
1645, Elizabeth takes up Descartes' previous comments, to rebut them. "To evaluate 
goods adequately, it is necessary to know them perfectly; to be completely acquainted 
with all those among which we must choose in an active life would require an infinite 
science." What Descartes has said does not seem to capture her experience.  
       Then she asks the question which will result in Descartes' final work. "I would like to 
see you define the passions, in order to know them better, because those who call them 
disturbances of the soul would persuade me that their force only consists in dazzling and 
subjecting the reason if my experience didn't also show me that there are some that lead 
to rational actions." We are beginning to understand that between them there is no longer 
the relation of master to disciple, but a dialectic at work  he, the metaphysician 
relentlessly presenting the consequences of that metaphysics of the separation of mind 
and body; she, the vibrant living womanly princess for whom "virtue is not a rational 
distance from emotion nor a stoic attitude of indifference to events. It is the proper 
handling of life."23  
       He certainly does not relent in the presentation of his position, altogether consistent 
with the metaphysics of the Meditations and indeed a deduction from it. This is most 
evident in his answer to her last letter, where she had asked how one could strengthen the 
understanding to discern what is the best in all the actions of life. Two things seem 
                                                
23 Nye, 60. 
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necessary: knowledge of the truth; the other is practice in remembering and assenting to 
this knowledge whenever the occasion demands. Only God knows everything. We have 
to be content with knowing the truths most useful to us. First and chief  there is a God on 
whom all things depend, whose perfections are infinite, whose power immense, whose 
decrees are infallible. This teaches us to accept calmly all the things which happen to us 
as expressly sent by God, that is, a firm belief in divine providence. The second thing  the 
nature of our soul, that it subsists apart from the body, is much nobler than the body, is 
capable of enjoying countless satisfactions not to be found in this life. This prevents us 
from fearing death, detaches our affections from the things of this world so that we look 
upon whatever is in the power of fortune with nothing but scorn. Thirdly, there is the 
immensity of the universe, which would persuade us against the view that all the heavens 
are made only for the service of the earth, and the earth only for man, a firm antidote 
therefore to anthropomorphism. We cannot know final causes, and therefore have no 
sound argument for one outcome in history or nature rather than another. Finally, though 
each of us is a person distinct from others, whose interests are accordingly in some way 
different from those of the rest of the world, we ought still to think that none of us could 
subsist alone...each of us is really one of the many parts of the universe, ...the earth, the 
state, the society, the family. And the interests of the whole, of which each of us is a part, 
must always be preferred to those of our own particular person, with measure though 
since it would be wrong to expose ourselves to a great evil in order to procure only a 
slight benefit to our kinfolk or our country. "Once someone knows and loves God as he 
should, he has a natural impulse to think in this way; for then, abandoning himself 
altogether to God's will, he strips himself of his own interests, and has no other passion 
than to do what he thinks pleasing to God."24 This is the philosophical and theological 
basis for the maxims he has proposed to Elizabeth.  
       It is clear from her response that she has no firm belief in the divine providence, for 
it cannot extend to what arises from free will: "But those [misfortunes] which are 
imposed on us by men, for which the decision seems to us to be entirely free, for these 
the existence of God would only console if we had faith that could persuade us that God 
takes the care to regulate the wills of men and that he has determined the fate of each 
person before the creation of the world." Further, the immortality of the soul "along with 
the knowledge that it is much more beautiful than the body, is capable of making us seek 
death as well as fear it...", again not a firm conviction in taking all elements of our lives 
as emanating from a benevolent God, as Descartes has indicated. Further, "The great 
extent of the universe...serves to detach our affections from what we experience in it; but 
it also separates us from that individual Providence which is the foundation of theology 
from the idea we have of God."25 In his next to her and her answer, it is clear that she 
continues to dispute with him, sometimes seeming to play the devil's advocate. She is not 
the docile disciple but feisty and combative. One thing seems clear: abstract arguments 
where the conclusions are contrary to her experience do not satisfy her. And this even 
extends to basic Cartesian principles such as the infinite Divine power, the separation of 
soul and body, etc. She takes on all of them. He is too sanguine. If he urges `prudence', 
                                                
24 To Elizabeth, 15 September 1645, AT iv, 290. 
25 To Descartes, 30 September 1645, AT iv, 302-3. 
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she is moved by `passion'. So he must explain the passions, or else he leaves his work 
unfinished.  
 
C. The Near Occasion Of The Passions Of The Soul 
       In late autumn of 1645, Elizabeth's brother Edward brought the cause of the whole 
House of the Palatinate to a sorry state. He married Anne de Gonzague of loose morals, 
but that was not the worst of it. She was a Polish princess and part of the marriage 
agreement was that he would convert to the Roman Church. To understand the 
implications for his family, indeed for the Protestant cause, a little historical account is 
called for. In 1613, Ferdinand, elector of the Palatine, had married the beautiful Elizabeth 
Stuart, daughter of James I, and united in that marriage the two sides of Protestant 
reform, Calvinism and Lutheranism. The Palatine court had been the first to sound the 
alarm of an alliance of the Empire, the papacy and Spain against the Protestants, and 
proposed a Protestant league of unite the reformers in Holland, England, French 
Huguenots and France. Then Frederick, urged by his maternal relatives of the House of 
Orange, accepted the Bohemian throne from Protestant reformers. The Holy Roman 
Empire and Philip of Spain were not willing to have the Bohemian throne go to the 
Protestants, and in less than a year defeated Ferdinand, dethroned him, stripped him of 
his electorship and all his territory. Thus was begun the Thirty Years War. Ferdinand died 
in 1632, and passed to his sons whatever leadership he still possessed in the Protestant 
cause. "Edward's conversion to Catholicism was no simple personal choice; it was an 
affair of state."26 The household in The Hague was mortified and enraged at the treachery 
of Edward, and Elizabeth, in despair, wrote to Descartes, her faithful friend and confidant 
Her brother Edward has defected to the other side, "has fallen into the hands of certain 
sorts of people who have more hate for our house than affection for their religion, and has 
let himself be caught in their traps to the point of changing his religion to make himself 
Roman Catholic without giving the slightest indication that he was following his 
conscience." She sees him "whom I love with as much tenderness as I have for anyone" 
now universally despised and , according to her faith, having lost his soul. There is not 
for her any consolation in the thought that the Divine Providence was at work here. She 
still has trouble reconciling the independence of free will to its dependence on the will of 
God, and clearly in the case of her brother she cannot but blame him and those who 
conspired against her House. "I have trouble persuading myself that we have always 
more good in life than evil...there are so many ways to lose one's way for one which leads 
down the right path, there are so many persons with the design and power to do harm for 
a few who have either the one or the other to serve us." She knows her state of mind has 
not seemed to profit from his words, but still she asks for enlightenment from him "that 
is, if I dare to ask you for more light, after having so badly used that which you have 
already given to ..."27  
                                                
26 Nye, 78. 
27 To Descartes, 30 November 1645, AT iv, 335-7. 
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       There was no answer to her letter, no comment or sympathy. Then on 27 Dec. a 
young man appeared at the door, with a short note from Descartes asking that she not 
favour a rival to the bearer, the son of Professor Schooten, for the post in mathematics at 
Utrecht. She writes to assure Descartes that not only will she not harm his chances, but 
will do all she can on his behalf. She spoke with one of the curators, Monsieur de 
Wimenom, who promised to work in his behalf, even though there is some plan to 
abolish the post altogether. The young Schooten rushed away before she had a chance to 
reassure him. Then she adds poignantly "I am afraid that you have not received my last 
letter of the 30th of November because you made no mention of it. I would be upset if it 
got into the hands of one of those critics who condemn as heresy any doubts one has 
about received opinion." Descartes' note was business-like and, in the light of her troubles 
with Edward, distant and cold.  
       Then a letter, Jan. 1646. It begins, "I cannot deny that I was not surprised to learn 
that Your Highness was annoyed, to the point where her health was affected, by an event 
which most people will consider to be good, and which the rest may overlook for several 
strong reasons." All the Catholics, the majority in Europe, will approve it; even if 
Edward's motives were not noble, still the Catholics will reflect that God employs even 
base motives to draw souls to Himself. The Protestants, if they speak badly of him, must 
reflect on such a judgment, for where there are two sides it is impossible to please the one 
without displeasing the other. They have no reason to ridicule one who leaves their 
church, given that they would not themselves belong to it if their forefathers had not left 
the Church of Rome.  
       It is a hard reply, but wholly in accordance with the principles he has stated to her 
over and over again. Then these words: "...it is true that those who have Fortune as a 
house guest are right to stay close to her, and to join forces in order to prevent her from 
escaping; whereas I think those whose home she has fled [Gloss --your house, Madame!] 
will do well to agree to follow various different paths so that at least one of them may 
meet her, even if not all can find her. [Gloss  Edward has taken a different path] At the 
same time, because each of them is thought to have many resources, including friends in 
various places, this makes them more powerful than if all followed the same path." This 
is his answer to her claim that Edward has fallen in with certain people "who have more 
hate for our house than affection for their religion." He adds that he does not suppose that 
his arguments would prevent Elizabeth from feeling resentment, and only hopes that time 
has weakened her pique before this letter reaches her. He fears it would reawaken it if he 
discussed the matter at greater length. The response is not sympathetic, but it is practical 
and sensible. Perhaps he waited this long to respond because he knew her passions were 
aroused and what he might say would fall on deaf ears. Even now he takes a chance.  
       He returns to the problem of free will, giving an interesting analogy which really 
touches the issue: a king had forbidden duels while knowing with certainty that if A and 
B meet they will fight a duel. The king then orders A to go to a certain place where he 
knows B will be. Although he knows that they will engage in the duel, they engage 
freely. The subtext here is that in disobeying the king's command and engaging in the 
duel, they bring their private differences and hatred into relation to the king, which is 
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both better and worse than their antipathies outside the command, better because the king 
knows there is no cure for their mutual hatred until it is brought to a head, worse because 
A and B now know that their differences are not merely private but harmful to the 
kingdom itself.28 Then Descartes turns to the problem of whether in this life we always 
have more good things than evil. Because on his principles we must count as worthless 
anything which does not depend on us ourselves, then whatever outside us that befalls us 
[as Edward's marriage, for example] is to be regarded as no more important than actors 
performing a drama before us. "...It is with this profession that I observe in all my 
actions, and with the profession in particular of being always, etc."  
       There is no extant correspondence between them for four months. Did he visit? Or 
was there an estrangement as there appears to have been in the letter he wrote. But he was 
at work on the Passions, the manuscript which he brought to her in early March, 1646. 
Perhaps his silence was simply necessary to him to do this serious work. It is a work 
inspired by her questions, her difficulties with his programme of living solely the life of 
the mind, turning away therefore from life and its problems. What he produces is far 
more developed than the assertion he made in Meditations of the union of soul and body 
in man, and comprehensive of the whole correspondence with her. This development in 
Descartes' thought is too little known, and clearly he owes a great deal to Elizabeth in its 
production.  
 
D. The Passions Of The Soul 
       Early in his correspondence with Elizabeth, Descartes had referred to "three kinds of 
primitive notions", the mind, the body, and the union of the two.29 In Principles II, 
Descartes gives the argument for our knowledge that the human body is closely 
conjoined with the mind, an argument analogous to the argument that material things 
exist:  
By the same token, the conclusion that there is a particular body that is 
more closely conjoined with our mind than any other body follows from 
our clear awareness that pain and other sensations come to us quite 
unexpectedly. The mind is aware that these sensations do not come from 
itself alone, and that they cannot belong to it simply in virtue of its being a 
thinking thing; instead, they can belong to it only in virtue of its being 
joined to something other than itself which is extended and moveable  
namely what we call the human body.30  
       But Descartes first knows the substantiality of himself as a thinking thing. This is 
primary, and anything else he comes to know must be subsequent or it cannot be said to 
be known by him. He knows God in himself precisely as a thinking thing. Next, through 
                                                
28 Cf Romans 7. 
29 To Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT iii, 691. 
30 Principles, Part Two, n. 2. 
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the mediation of God, he comes to know nature as unlike and opposite to himself as a 
thinking thing, nature also as substance and as such incorruptible. In nature, he finds the 
proper object for his scientific understanding. His relation to nature is to something to be 
known, not something in which he is immersed or in which he exists.  
       That he is a substance means that he "exists in such a way as to depend on no other 
thing for [his] existence." He is a finite substance, depending therefore on the sustaining 
concurrence of God, but self-subsistent nonetheless in the sense that he exists without 
need of any other created thing. But perhaps the pronoun "he" is improper here  we do 
not mean the individual Descartes  for it is of the nature of substance to be indestructible, 
and so to continue in existence unless annihilated by God: "... we need to know that 
absolutely all substances, or things which must be created by God in order to exist, are by 
their nature incorruptible and cannot ever cease to exist unless they are reduced to 
nothingness by God's denying his concurrence to them." [Synopsis to Meditations, CSM 
2.10] Descartes will die, all temporal life having the germ of death within itself, but his 
substantiality endures, as does the substantiality also of body in general, corpus in 
genere: "...we need to recognize that body, taken in the general sense [extension] is a 
substance, so that it too never perishes..." 31[Ibid.]  
       Yet Descartes also comes to know himself as man, a mind in a body, a body quite 
unique to himself, and thus different from those bodies he studies with his scientific 
understanding. He can study his own body, its anatomy and physiology, as he might 
objectively study other bodies; but its relation to him is nonetheless intimate -- it is truly 
his own, unlike other bodies which he can see and touch, but are not his very self. He 
knows himself as a man to be temporal and immersed in nature, encountering bodies via 
his body, bumping into them, experiencing them with his external senses. He knows 
hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure, via his internal senses. Even before he came to know 
these things, he experienced them. But it is only because he is a thinking substance who 
came to know nature in the manner sketched above that he can be said now to know these 
things.  
       What is the relation between these two senses of himself, his substantial, eternal 
thinking self, really distinct from body, and his temporal embodied self? Implicit in the 
doctrine that substance is incorruptible is the denial of substantial form, the principle of 
substantial change in the Aristotelian philosophy. And with this also the denial of 
generation and corruption. Change, even the apparent coming-into-being and passing-
away, is simply the alteration of figure, size, shape and the transfer of motion from one 
part of matter to another. The common-sense world of everyday experience is 
reinterpreted as a scientific, mechanistic world. If it is inconceivable that a substance 
should come into existence without being created de novo by God, then what we seem to 
                                                
31 Synopsis 2.10. It is not therefore 'indivisibility' which is the source of the incorruptibility of substance, 
since although mens is indivisible, corpus in genere is not. See AT vii, 13-14, CSM 2.10. Rather, it is 
simplicity in this sense, that accidents or modes of mind are not included in its essence, in contrast to 
particular bodies which are constituted precisely by their accidents. As for corpus in genere, it too is not 
constituted by its accidents, but rather that which sustains them, itself remaining incorruptible throughout 
these constant changes which constitute particular bodies. 
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see every day  various so-called substances coming into existence by purely natural 
means -- is mistaken.32  
       There is, however, one exceptional case, for the human soul is "the true substantial 
form of man"33 Descartes had always affirmed the substantial union of soul and body, the 
essential unity of the human being. This is one of the principal theses of the Sixth 
Meditation. "This body" which "by a particular right I call mine" is not such that I am 
"merely lodged in it like a pilot in his ship", which would be the condition of an angel if 
it were conjoined to a body. "If an angel were united to a human body", he writes "it 
would not have feelings like us, but would merely perceive the movements caused by 
external objects, and in that respect would differ from a genuine human being."34 
Descartes also says that the human body is "informed" by the soul: "The numerical 
identity of the body of a human being does not depend on that of its matter, but on its 
form, which is the soul."35 Earlier he had called the soul "the true substantial form of 
man"36. As Geneviève Rodi-Lewis notes, "These statements...are not in any way a 
concession to the traditional vocabulary or a residual formula from previous ways of 
talking, ineptly tacked on to the surface of Descartes' dualism. On the contrary, they refer 
to the reality of a substantial form, the 'only' authentic example of the genre."37 It is for 
this reason that only humans have true feelings, only they have sensory perceptions, 
which are useful, he says in Principles II, 3, not for instructing us about objects as they 
are in themselves but only to show us what is beneficial or harmful to man's composite 
nature. And for this reason that, whereas the behaviour of animals can be explained 
reductively, the behaviour of the human being cannot.38  
       Who or what is this individual human being  Elizabeth, Descartes, whoever  and how 
is she related to that individual thinking thing, the cogito, which can exist without a 
body? 39We are much more acquainted with the cogito, the "I" which is substantially 
distinct from body, indivisible and therefore purportedly immortal, an ego which can be 
what it is whether it has senses or not, or whether the objects of those senses exist or not. 
But the individual human being, that unity of mind and a very particular body, with a 
history and definite relations to other bodies and other humans, is also introduced in the 
                                                
32 Indirectly, AT iii, 505; CSMK 208. Note that an account of nature in terms of 'substantial forms' is not 
equal, indeed opposed to, the Christian doctrine of creation. It is part of Descartes' definition of "substance" 
as found in the Synopsis that if it is finite it is a "thing which must be created by God in order to exist." 
33 To Regius, Feb. 1642, AT iii, 439. 
34 To Regius, Feb. 1642, AT iii, 493. 
35 To Mesland, 1645 or 1646, AT iv, 346; CSMK 279. 
36 To Regius, January 1642, AT iii, 505; CSMK 208.. 
37 "Descartes and the Unity of the Human Being" in Descartes: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. John 
Cottingham, Oxford, 1998, 197-210, on 205. The passage continues: "...and this reveals the genesis of the 
classic error of the Aristotelians  an anthropomorphic generalization, where everything is, as it were, 
'animated' by little entities." 
38 "We observe in animals movements similar to those which result from our imaginations and sensations; 
but that does not mean that we observe imaginations and sensations in them. On the contrary, these same 
movements can take place without imagination, and we have arguments to prove that they do so take place 
in animals..." To Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT iii, 479; CSMK 203-4. 
39 Amélie Rorty asks this question in a remarkable article, "Cartesian Passions and the Union of Mind and 
Body" In Essays on Descartes' Meditations (ed. Amélie Rorty), Berkeley, 1986, 213-234. 
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Sixth Meditation. Much greater elaboration is given in the work inspired by Elizabeth's 
questions, The Passions of the Soul.  
       In all cases where there is something in the soul caused by the body, there is in 
Descartes' terminology a 'passion'. There are three elementary kinds of 'passion': 
perceptions of things external to the soul40 ; then perceptions we refer to our own body 
(bodily sensations), such as hunger, thirst, pain; finally, perceptions we refer to our soul - 
effects we feel as being in the soul itself, e.g. sadness, anger, joy, which are aroused 
sometimes by objects which stimulate our nerves and sometimes by other causes. 
Although all these are 'passions' with respect to the soul (the soul is in some sense passive 
and receptive with regard to them), we reserve the word for this third class, and this class 
is what Descartes undertakes to explain in Passions of the Soul. He defines them as 
"those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, 
and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits41." 
[Part I, n.27]. We might note with him that to call them 'perceptions' does not mean that 
they are evident. Indeed, they are likely confused and obscure. Thus, it might be better to 
call them 'emotions' of the soul because, of all the kinds of thoughts which the soul may 
have, none agitate and disturb it so strongly as these passions.  
       But each of these three reveals something distinctive about the mind's relation to 
body. The first sort, perceptions, although they are "confused representations of their 
causes", show that the mind can be conjoined with its body in such a way that it can be 
affected and modified by extension. The second sort, bodily sensations, show that the 
mind is conjoined with one piece of extension in such a way that it permeates and 
penetrates every part of it, as though it were mixed with (quasi permixtum in the words of 
Meditation 6) its own body. Even though they too only confusedly represent the body's 
true condition, bodily sensations reveal that the relation of mind to body in us cannot be 
"as a pilot is in the ship". But they do not tell us, as does the third sort, the passions 
proper, that mind is the substantial form of the body, its true unity, that mind and body 
form a substantial union.42 An angel, to use the earlier example, could 'see' the green of 
the wood, 'hear' the song of a bird, if it were somehow filtered through an angelic pineal 
gland to the angelic soul, but would not be transported by these perceptions; a Cartesian 
ego-cum-scientist could conduct his experiments, grow weary at his desk, stop his work 
for a light supper, but would not enjoy the work, rest or supper. Only a man or woman 
could be moved by laughter or tears, could temper his natural fear of the enemy with 
                                                
40 These to be distinguished from perceptions of internal states, such as perceiving that we're thinking, or 
perceiving that we are willing, doubting, etc. 
41 These are the 'animal spirits', described in this passage from Passions I, 7: "Finally, it is known that all 
these movements of the muscles, and likewise all sensations, depend on the nerves, which are like little 
threads or tubes coming from the brain and containing, like the brain itself, a certain very subtle air or wind 
which is called the `animal spirits'." 
42 Rorty, 520-21: "If we had only perceptions and bodily sensations, the mind might be merely mixed with 
the body ... Passions proper, passion-emotions, reveal that the mind, when quasi-permixed with the body, 
forms unified whole that can function well or ill as that whole, and not merely as a continuing, individuated 
mixture of two substances, mind and body." 
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devotion to king or country, blush or wonder or be amazed. For this reason Descartes 
adds: "It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends."43  
      " It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends." How could 
he have come to such a conclusion? Perhaps he knew this as he wrote his earlier works, 
but if so the reader would not have seen any evidence of it, would not have guessed it. It 
is not in any way inconsistent with his former works, is in every way a further 
development of the Meditations, but it is nonetheless surprising. What has transpired in 
the interval between the Meditations and the Passions of the Soul to have prompted this 
explicit development? It is clear in the correspondence with Princess Elizabeth that her 
difficulties had not been addressed in Descartes' earlier work, clear also that his answers 
did not seem to address her explicit questions. Has he been moved to these new thoughts 
by her insistent opposition to answers which would dismiss or diminish her passionate 
engagement with life? That is obvious in the course of their relationship and 
correspondence.  
       Elizabeth's demand is nothing less than a demand for a reconciliation of Cartesian 
reason and history, her history and the history of her people, the reconciliation of the 
universal and particular, of human and divine  in short, making the Christian 
reconciliation concrete to herself. She is not satisfied to let go of either side: she is a 
scholar whom Descartes says has best understood his philosophy, but she is also 
completely engaged in her world. When pushed, she takes her place on the side of the 
human, the events of her time, the particular  she is more attached to or persuaded of 
human freedom, the tragedy of her House, her own vexing family problems, than of the 
side Descartes holds out to her. She does not deny what he says, and opposes him only so 
far as the consequences appear to her to deny or diminish the other side which she brings 
before him, presents to him for the longed-for reconciliation.  
       Descartes for his part knew the union of soul and body in his idea of God: God 
would be a deceiver if we were not such a unity, just as God would be a deceiver if 
material bodies did not exist. Still, he would not deny that soul and body are separable.  
I would say the same about the soul and the body and in general all the 
things of which we have distinct and complete ideas; that is, I say that 
their being inseparable involves a contradiction. But I do not on that 
account deny that there can be in soul and body many properties of which 
I have no ideas; I deny only that there are any which are inconsistent with 
the ideas of them that I do have, including the idea I have of their 
distinctness.44  
Descartes knows the real distinction of mind and body in his own thinking, and on that 
distinction his whole science of nature is founded. On the one hand he knows the union, 
on the other the distinction. But he is not able to draw these two into relation, and he 
                                                
43 Passions III, n. 212. 
44 To Gibieuf, 10 January 1642, AT iii, 478; CSMK, 203. 
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knows it too  he says we can't think both sides at once. This philosophy is not therefore 
equal to a proper philosophical account of human institutions; ethical and political 
philosophy are outside the Cartesian philosophy of substance. Does Elizabeth's demand 
move him farther along in this dialectic? This much can be said: the Passions of the Soul 
is inspired by her, shaped by her questions and their correspondence, and draws together 
as far as he is able her position and his. In it for the first time he has been able to say  
perhaps he has come to know  that "it is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of 
this life depend."  
 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
       As one might expect, Descartes writes about amour in the Passions of the Soul in the 
dispassionate manner of the physicien45. The passion of amour he defines as "an emotion 
of the soul caused by a movement of the spirits, which impels the soul to join itself 
willingly to objects that appear agreeable to it." [PA ii, n.79] He does not think that the 
distinction of `benevolent love' and `concupiscent love' is very helpful, since both 
benevolence, i.e. joining to the beloved the things we believe agreeable to it, and 
concupiscense, desiring to possess the beloved, are principal effects of love, present not 
inevitably but normally where there is love.46 There is nothing original in Descartes' 
description of the kinds of love, based on the difference in esteem we have for the 
beloved. Simple affection is the esteem we have for those objects that we esteem less 
than we esteem ourselves, for example the love we might have for "a flower, or a bird, or 
horse"...or M. Grat, Descartes' little dog.47 When we esteem the beloved as much as we 
esteem ourselves, then there is friendship (amitié). "They are so truly objects of this 
passion that there is no person so imperfect that we could not have for him a very perfect 
friendship, given that we believe ourselves loved by him and that we have a truly noble 
and generous soul." When the object of our love is esteemed more than we esteem 
ourselves, then there is 'devotion'. The principal object of devotion is God, but also 
perhaps our sovereign, country, town, or even some person for whom we have more 
esteem than ourselves.  
       And what sort of love does Descartes have for Princess Elizabeth, and she for him. 
Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, in her biography of Descartes, speculates, "If one distinguishes 
concupiscent love from benevolent love by its effects, the first is ruled out because of 
Descartes' and Elizabeth's respect for each other."48 Yet Descartes says that both 
                                                
45 He characterized his intention in that work as "explain[ing] the passions only as a physicien [physicist, 
natural philosopher], and not as an orateur or as a Philosophe moral." Second Prefatory Letter to Passions 
of the Soul, AT xi, 326. 
46 The ambitious man's passion for glory, the miser's passion for money, the drunk's for wine, might be 
almost exclusively concupiscent, as the father's love for his children or the honourable man's love for his 
friend might be almost exclusively benevolent. PA ii, 82. 
47 Descartes' little dog, Mr. Scratch, is mentioned in a letter to l'Abbé Picot, 28 Feb. 1648, quoted by 
Baillet. AT v, 133, note a. 
48 . In a letter to his friend, Chanut, the French ambassador to Sweden, Descartes writes: "And if I asked 
you frankly whether you love that great Queen at whose Court you now are, it would be useless for you to 
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benevolence and concupiscence are 'normally' present wherever there is love. Rodis-
Lewis continues: "The second, which incites us to wish well on those we love, includes 
family affections and the attachment between two friends. But respect is equal between 
friends; it becomes devotion when one of them bows down to the other. 'Your devoted 
one' Descartes added to the usual formulas of politeness, and Elizabeth signed, 'Your very 
affectionate friend'." But Descartes uses precisely the same formula, `Your very humble 
and very obedient servant' to his equals, to Huygens, Mersenne, to many people he 
corresponds with, even to a lawyer.49  
       The relationship between Descartes and Elizabeth has been the subject of some 
speculation ever since the nineteenth century editor, Foucher de Careil, speculated that 
there was something more than respect between them. G. Cohen suggests that the 
relationship was not altogether love or altogether friendship, but had "hidden tokens of 
affection" together with "refinement, which has the charm of love" as elements in it.50 For 
anyone who has read the letters of medieval 'spiritual friendship', or of Heloise and 
Abelard, for anyone who has had the good fortune to engage in such a correspondence, 
bordering on the romantic but not explicitly so, there are elements in the letters between 
Descartes to Elizabeth which suggest a deepening familiarity, concern and openness 
between them. It could not be more than it is, however. As Descartes writes to Chanut: "It 
is true that the custom of our speech and the courtesy of good manners does not allow us 
to tell those whose condition is far above ours that we love them; we may say only that 
we respect, honour, esteem them, and that we have zeal and devotion for their 
service...But philosophers are not accustomed to give different names to things which 
share the same definition, and I know no other definition of love save that it is a passion 
which makes us join ourselves willingly to some object, no matter whether the object is 
equal to or greater or less than us."51  
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day that you had only respect, veneration and admiration for her; I would judge none the less that you have 
also a very ardent affection for her."1 Feb 1647, AT v, 611. That would seem to be more than 'devotion'. 
49 "Your devoted one" never appears in the Adam-Tannery edition. Perhaps Mme Rodis-Lewis has access 
to manuscripts which are not available to others. She is otherwise an excellent source of information and 
analysis on Descartes. 
50 Les écrivains français en Hollande dans la première moitié du XVIIe siecle, 1920, quoted in Rodis-
Lewis, 246, n.4. 
51 To Chanut, 1 Feb. 1647, AT v, 610-11. 
